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CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE IN THE INVESTMENT TREATY 
UNIVERSE - SCOPING THE POTENTIAL FOR MULTILATERAL 
CONSOLIDATION 
 
WOLFGANG ALSCHNER & DMITRIY SKOUGAREVSKIY† 
 
How far are we from a multilateral investment treaty? In this paper we answer 
this question by empirically assessing convergence and divergence in the pool of 
existing bilateral investment treaties (BITs) scoping the potential for multilateral 
consolidation. To do so, we introduce a novel automated coding procedure, which 
investigates investment treaty content across 1628 English-language BITs and 
their 22,500 articles. We show that treaties are split into older, short and shallow 
agreements and newer, deep and complex ones. This creates possibilities for 
consolidation around a lowest common denominator. A multilateral treaty with 
the 27 most prevalent features (out of a total of 66 coded features) would already 
substitute the content of 50% of all BITs and one with the 36 features could 
replace 80% of agreements. In contrast, consolidating practice around deeper 
agreements balancing investment protection and State sovereigntyexplicitly is 
politically more desirable, but also more ambitious. Only a minority of treaties 
contain non-investment protection features and their design diverges increasingly as 
States adopt varying architectures to solve similar policy challenges.As a result, 
further consolidation at the regional level and partial multilateralizations become 
necessary stepping-stones, if a future multilateral investment agreement is to 
converge practice around deeper BITs. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
With over 3000 international investment agreements (IIAs) protecting foreign 
capital abroad,1 the size of the IIA universe has become a challenge for all 
stakeholders. As the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) put it in a recent report “[w]ith thousands of treaties, many ongoing 
negotiations and multiple dispute-settlement mechanisms, today’s IIA regime has 
come close to a point where it is too big and complex to handle for governments 
and investors alike”.2 One way to reduce this complexity is to replacethe myriad of 
bilateral investment treaties (BITs) with one multilateral investment agreement. 
Aside from the political will required for such an endeavour, a key obstacle on the 
path towards multilateralism is the seemingly divergent content of BITs. But how 
divergent are BITs in reality? Answering thisquestion will help in the assessment of 
how difficult it would be to consolidate existing practice under a single multilateral 
umbrella. 
 
                                                 
1UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2016 - INVESTOR NATIONALITY: POLICY 
CHALLENGES, 101 (2016), http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2016_en.pdf. 
2UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2011, NON-EQUITY MODES OF 
INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, XVII (2011), 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2011_en.pdf. 
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In this article, we empirically investigate the degree of treaty design convergence 
and divergence in over 22,500 articles of 1628 English-language BITs that have 
been concluded from the year 1959 until 2015, involving 171 countries. To this 
end, we develop a novel automatedcoding procedure that allows us to compare 
treaty design in unprecedented breadth and depth. Our analysis reveals that the 
BIT universe is split into older, short and shallow agreements that focus on 
investment protection only; and newer, comprehensive and complex ones that 
treat investment in its wider policy context. This creates a theoretical potential for 
consolidation at the bottom, around core investment protection standards that 
virtually every country has accepted in at least one treaty. In contrast, consolidation 
at the top around more complex treaties with more varied features, only included 
by a handful of States, is more ambitious. 
 
However, there is a tension between the theoretical possibility of consolidation and 
its desirability. The current policy discourse has become critical of simple, shallow 
agreements and favoursmore complextreaties that strike a balance between 
protecting investment abroad while safeguarding policy space at home.To assess 
how difficult it would be to consolidate practice at the top rather than the bottom, 
we investigate treaty divergence in more detail. We find that although only few 
States have signed complex agreements, their share is growing. At the same time, 
the design of these deeper treaties diverges more strongly than that of shallow 
ones. As treaty elements diffuse selectively and countries cherry-pick design 
innovations from global practice, the BIT universe is getting increasingly 
fragmented.As a result, consolidation at the top currentlyseems elusive and further 
policy convergence is needed, including thorough regional initiatives or partial 
multilateralization, to clear the path for an eventual global consensus around deep 
investment treaty design. 
 
In this article, we begin by conceptualizing the path towards multilateralization of 
investment law as one of consolidating existing practice. Thereafter, we introduce 
our automated coding methodology to empirically investigate the scope for 
consolidation through convergence and divergence across treaties. We 
subsequently apply that methodology to explore convergence among BITs, 
outlining the scope for consolidation at the bottom around simple agreements and 
at the top around complex ones.We then shift the focus to the elements of 
divergence to identify obstacles for multilateral consolidation at the top. Finally, we 
conclude by outlining ways to overcome these obstacles and build multilateral 
consensus incrementally. 
 
II. MULTILATERALIZATION THROUGH CONSOLIDATION 
 
Countries have concluded close to 3000 bilateral investment treaties and almost 
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every State in the world is signatory to at least one of such agreements.3 Not only 
do investment agreements have global reach, but they are also relatively similar to 
each other. According to Dolzer and Schreuer, BITs share common principles of 
investment protection while differing in their fine print.4 Salacuse even concludes 
that BITs have converged into a global regime for investment protection 
characterized by common structures, principles, norms, rules and decision-making 
processes.5 Given this apparent similarity and worldwide reach, one may think that 
it should not be too difficult to replace thousands of bilateral deals with a 
singlemultilateral one. 
 
Yet, efforts to conclude a multilateral investment agreement have so far been 
unsuccessful. Attempts to create such a treaty failed under the auspices of the 
OECD in the 1960s, 1990s and more recently at the WTO.6 Although plurilateral 
and regional investment treaties have been concluded among larger subsets of 
States, they tend to complement rather than substitute parallel bilateral treaties.7 
States thus continue to conclude and rely on BITs to protect their investors 
abroad. 
 
One reason for the popularity of BITs is their adaptability. BITs can be moulded 
more closely to the treaty design preferences of their signatories than their 
multilateral counterpart. Indeed, empirical research has shown that negotiated BITs 
are often closely tailored to match the treaty templates of developed States.8 
Therefore, the adaptability of BITs to unilateral preferences is their key advantage 
over a multilateral treaty, which would require multi-party compromises. We can 
                                                 
3 Our sample includes English-language treaties signed by 171 States. The detailed 
description of the data is given in Wolfgang Alschner & Dmitriy Skougarevskiy, Mapping the 
Universe of International Investment Agreements, 19J. INT’L. ECON. L. (2016), Appendix (Full text 
coverage of the data set) [hereinafter Alschner & Skougarevskiy]. 
4RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW (2d ed. 2012) [hereinafter DOLZER  & SCHREUER]. 
5JESWALD W. SALACUSE, THE LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES (2010) [hereinafter 
SALACUSE, INVESTMENT TREATIES]; Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Emerging Global Regime for 
Investment, 51 HARV. INT'L L.J. 427, 432–553 (2010) [hereinafter Salacuse, Global Regime]. 
6See UNCTAD, LESSONS FROM THE MAI (UNCTAD Series on Issues in International 
Investment Agreements), UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/Misc22, U. N. Sales No. E.99.II.D.26, 
(1999), http://unctad.org/en/Docs/psiteiitm22.en.pdf; Peter T. Muchlinski, The Rise and 
Fall of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment: Where Now?, INT'L. L. 1033–1053 (2000); Pierre 
Sauvé, Multilateral Rules on Investment: Is Forward Movement Possible?, 9 J. INT'L. ECON. L. 325–
355 (2006). 
7Wolfgang Alschner, Regionalism and Overlap in Investment Treaty Law: Towards Consolidation or 
Contradiction?, 17 J. INT'L. ECON. L. 271–98 (2014) [hereinafter Alschner, Regionalism]. 
8BITs of developed countries, for instance, closely resemble their model treaties. Alschner 
& Skougarevskiy, supra note 3, at 6. 
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then scope the potential of the latter by measuring the degree to which States make 
use of the adaptability of the former. Put differently, by quantifying the degree of 
convergence and divergence among BITs we can get a sense of how far we are 
from a multilateral substitute. Hypothetically, ifall bilateral investment agreements 
looked alike, then it would be easy to consolidate them into a multilateral 
agreement without thereby altering States’ legal relations.9 If, however, the terms 
vary starkly across bilateral agreements, then it would be difficult to consolidate 
them without deviating significantly from the preferences expressed in bilateral 
treaties. The prospect for multilateralization can thus be reframed and empirically 
tested as a function of the scope for consolidation of existing bilateral treaty 
relationships. 
 
III. EMPIRICAL TREATY DESIGN RESEARCH AND THE AUTOMATED 
CODING OF TREATY PROVISIONS 
 
A. Existing Empirical Analysis of Investment Treaty Content 
 
Empirical research on the content of investment agreements has made significant 
advances in recent years. Several hand-coding initiatives have shed new light on the 
design of investment agreements. Chaisse and Bellak have coded 1498 BITs and 
158 PTAs across seven core investment treaty categories.10 UNCTAD went even 
further investigating 1458 BITs and PTAs along more than one hundred treaty 
dimensions.11 
 
Complementing these hand-coding efforts, text-as-data approaches have been 
employed to uncover latent structures in the IIA universe. In their past work, the 
authors of this articlehave introduced a textual distance metric and applied it to 
investigate bargaining asymmetries, treaty network consistency as well as design 
diffusion and innovation.12 In the process, they found, amongst others, that 81% 
of the Transpacific Partnership’s Investment Chapter has been copied and pasted 
from an earlier U.S. investment treaty.13 
                                                 
9 This article focuses on the consolidating effect of multilateralization.Other effects of 
multilateralization such as the expansion of investment norms to inter-state relationships 
currently not covered by BITs are left for future work. 
10Julien Chaisse & Christian Bellak, Navigating the Expanding Universe of International Treaties on 
Foreign Investment: Creation and Use of a Critical Index, 18 J. INT'L. ECON. L. 79–115 (2015). 
11 UNCTAD, IIA University Mapping Project (1st & 2d ed., 2013-2014),  
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Upload/Documents/UNCTAD%20IIA%20MAP
PING%20PROJECT%202013-2014.pdf. 
12Alschner & Skougarevskiy, supra note 3. 
13Wolfgang Alschner & Dmitriy Skougarevskiy, The New Gold Standard? Empirically Situating 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership in the Investment Treaty Universe, 17 J. WORLD INV. TRADE (2016). 
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Unfortunately, for an investigation of convergence and divergence across 
investment agreements, both approaches are sub-optimal. Neither the Chaisse and 
Bellak data nor the UNCTAD mapping yields data at the level of detail that would 
allow an in-depth comparison across potentially all investment treaties. Since both 
initiatives involve manual labelling of treaties, any re-coding to add further 
featuresorextend the set of codedtreaties would prove prohibitively costly for our 
purposes. 
 
Similarly, existing text-as-data approaches also do not offer satisfying solutions 
since detecting convergence and divergence at the sub-treaty level is a thorny 
problem. Comparing two BITs textually is meaningful to the extent that we know 
that both documents concern the same subject matter and pursue the same 
function. Since we expect an underlying similarity, differences between two BITs 
become interpretable. Once we go deeper into the text of treaties, however, this 
connection is lost as it is a priori unknown whether Article 10 in BIT A and Article 
10 in BIT B concern the same subject matter. Consequently, any text-as-data 
analysis on the sub-treaty level first has to match provisions that share a common 
content. 
 
Yet, borrowing from jargon, matching apples to apples and oranges to oranges is 
not a trivial problem. Provisions differ on many levels. First, they can concern the 
same subject matter, but use different words to address it making a purely textual 
similarity-based matching of articles problematic. Second, article headers can help 
to cluster provisions that relate to similar issues, but can also confuse the analysis 
as some articles have the same label, but different content; other treaty clauses 
contain no titles at all. Finally, provisions differ considerably in scope, with some 
treaties regulating what is elsewhere dispersed into a handful of separate clauses 
inasingle, extensive provision. 
 
Given that neither hand-coding nor existing text-as-data methods offer optimal 
results, we break new ground in this article.In order to seize the best of both 
worlds, we combine feature coding with text-as-data approaches to investigate 
convergence and divergence across investment treaties in unprecedented breadth 
and depth. To this end, we develop anautomated coding pipeline that assigns 
feature labels from a codebook to each article of an investment treaty. 
 
B. Two Approaches to Automated Coding 
 
Automated coding combines text-as-data approaches with human guidance. The 
advantage of automated coding over pure human coding is efficiency. Once the 
algorithm is written, it can label documents in a matter of seconds, while manual 
labelling would take months and incur significant costs. The added value of 
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machine coding as compared to pure text-as-data approaches, in turn, is that it 
proceeds deductively with human supervision. Unsupervised text-as-data 
approaches challenge the researcher to interpret automatically detected patterns 
and separate meaningful variation from noise.14 Machine labelling poses no 
equivalent difficulty, as the researcher knows from the start what she is looking for. 
 
Automatedcoding comes in two variations: supervised machine learning and rule-
based labelling. Under a supervised machine learning approach, the computer is 
trained with human-labelled training data and subsequently categorizes unlabelled 
data.15 A rule-based approach, in contrast, relies on a number of pre-defined 
procedures to assign labels to text. One very simpleprocedure could be that if the 
word “fair and equitable” is in a document, the computer should mark the treaty as 
containing a “fair and equitable treatment” clause. 
 
Both approaches have their advantages and drawbacks. Supervised machine 
learning can successfullyclassify fuzzy data where rule identification is difficult. Yet 
workhorse supervised machine-learning algorithms operate as black boxes. The 
reasons why a specific category is assigned by the machine cannot easily be 
discerned from the probabilistic algorithmand special effort has to go into testing 
precision and recall of results to ensure their accuracy.16 Rule-based approaches, in 
contrast, are perfectly transparent. Where a label is wrongly assigned, the rule can 
be amended to remedy the mistake. Yet, rule-based approaches are only sensible if 
variation in the data is manageable. Where a special rule needs to be written for 
each new document, such a procedure makes little sense. 
 
In the context of investment treaties, we can capitalize on their boilerplate 
language, underlying model agreements, and common roots in draft agreements of 
the 1960s to proceed with a rule-based approach. Part of the automated labelling 
infrastructure we build, however, also draws from supervised machine learning to 
label articles without headers. The design and operation of the machine-coding 
procedure is set out in detail in the paper’s annex.17 
 
C. Dataset and Codebook 
 
Our dataset consists of 1628 English language BIT full texts spanning from 1959 
                                                 
14See generally Justin Grimmer & Brandon M. Stewart, Text as Data: The Promise and Pitfalls of 
Automatic Content Analysis Methods for Political Texts, POL. ANALYSIS (2013). 
15See generally id. 
16Id. 
17 An interactive version of our coding results is available on our website 
mappinginvestmenttreaties.com. 
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to 2015 from different sources covering 171 countries.18 We split these 1628 BIT 
texts into their roughly 22,500 constituent provisions as corpus for our analysis. 
While this dataset only encompasses 51% of the investment treaty law universe, we 
are currently engaged in a research project to build a comprehensive set of IIAs on 
which our automated coding procedure can subsequently be run.19 
 
In order to extract legally relevant information from the treaties, we devised an 
original codebook. The elements of the codebook were identified by consulting 
international investment law text books,20 reports by international organizations,21 
BIT model agreements and commentaries22 as well as concluded BIT texts in order 
to devise a comprehensive list of clauses that are typically encountered in BITs.23 
 
The codebook follows a treestructure as depicted in Figure 1. Each branch of the 
tree represents a major section of a treaty, e.g. “definition and scope”, “promotion 
and admission”, “standards of protection”, “investor-state arbitration”, “treaty 
administration” etc. Each of these branches has sub-branches that reflect elements 
typically found within that branch: “fair and equitable treatment”, for instance, is 
an element of the branch “standards of protection” and “conduct of proceedings” 
is an element of the branch “investor-state dispute settlement”. Finally, each sub-
branch has sub-sub-branches that add further detail to each element, e.g. specifying 
whether “fair and equitable treatment”is linked to “customary international law”.  
 
                                                 
18 For a detailed description of our data generation technique, see Alschner, Regionalism, supra 
note 7. 
19 Swiss Network for International Studies Project Diffusion of International Law: A Textual 
Analysis of International Investment Agreements, http://www.snis.ch/project_diffusion-
international-law-textual-analysis-international-investment-agreements.  
20DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 4; SALACUSE, INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 5; 
Salacuse, Global Regime, supra note 5. 
21UNCTAD, IDENTIFYING CORE ELEMENTS IN INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS IN THE 
APEC REGION, (2008), UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2008/3, U. S. Sales No. 
E.08.II.D.27.,http://unctad.org/en/Docs/diaeia20083_en.pdf; UNCTAD, 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT RULE MAKING: STOCKTAKING CHALLENGES AND THE 
WAY FORWARD, (2009), UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2007/3, U. N. Sales No. E.08.II.D.1, 
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/iteiit20073_en.pdf; UNCTAD, BILATERAL INVESTMENT 
TREATIES 1995-2006: TRENDS IN INVESTMENT RULEMAKING (2007), 
UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2006/5, U.N. Sales No. E.06.II.D.16, 
http://unctad.org/en/docs/iteiia20065_en.pdf; UNCTAD, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
ARRANGEMENTS: TRENDS AND EMERGING ISSUES (2006), UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2005/11, 
U. N. Sales No. 06.II.D.3, http://unctad.org/en/Docs/iteiit200511_en.pdf. 
22CHESTER BROWN & DEVASHISH KRISHAN, COMMENTARIES ON SELECTED MODEL 
INVESTMENT TREATIES (2013). 
23 We thank our SNIS Project colleagues Rodrigo Polanco, Valentino Desilvestro, and 
Azernoosh Bazrafkan for their assistance in extending the codebook. 
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Figure 1: Tree structure of the codebook (partial illustration) 
 
 
Note: This figure exemplifies the tree structure of our codebook. Each BIT is 
represented as a set of categories (e.g. “Standards of Treatment”) with sub-
categories (e.g. “expropriation”) and sub-sub categories (e.g. “Standards of 
Compensation”). In total, our codebook has four levels of detail and consists of 
204 features at the fourth, most detailed level. 
 
In total, our codebook has four levels of depth. The fourth and most detailed layer 
currently comprises 204 specific elements capturing a significant part of the 
content variation encountered across investment treaties. The important advantage 
of the tree structure we devised is that it is self-populating. Once an inferior 
category is filled, this information is communicated up the branch to its superior 
category. Thus, we only need to check for the existence of fourth-layer-categories 
to fill the entire tree structure. 
 
The codebook is connectedto the automated rule-based coding pipeline that draws 
on BIT article headers as well as article text information to identify whether a given 
feature from the codebook is present in each of our 22,500 BIT articles. By 
implementing the pipeline, we obtain a detailed mapping of the content of each 
BIT and its constituent articles. 
 
IV. CONVERGENCE AS BASIS FOR CONSOLIDATION 
 
A. The Structure of the BIT Universe 
 
B
IT
 
Preamble 
Scope 
Promotion and 
Admission 
Standards of 
Treatment 
Fair and Equitable 
Treatment 
National Treatment 
Most-Favoured 
Nation Treatment 
Expropriation 
Scope of 
Expropriation 
Standard of 
Compensation 
Limitations on 
Expropriation 
Indirect Expropriation 
Defined 
Carve-out for Bona 
Fide Regulations 
… … 
… 
Exceptions 
Investor State 
Dispute Settlement 
… 
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In this section, we use our automated coding pipeline to understand the scope for 
potential convergence in the BIT universe. To get a sense of the structure of the 
BIT universe and the variation encountered therein, we begin our scoping exercise 
by reducing the results from the most detailed layer of our coded data consisting of 
204 treaty elements to two dimensions using metric multi-dimensional scaling 
(MDS).24 To facilitate the visual inspectionof our figure, we introduce a simple 
distinction. We assume that treaties that contain more articles are on average more 
complexand comprehensive agreements; conversely, treaties with fewer articles 
regulate investment relations in a simpler and more limited manner. On that basis, 
we visualize treaties with more than 20 articles as triangles and those with fewer 
articles as circles.  
 
Figure 2: The structure of the BIT universe based on a MDS representation of 
coding results 
 
 
 
Note: This figure reduces the matrix of 1628 BITs (rows) and the coding of their 
204 design features (columns) to two dimensions using metric multidimensional 
                                                 
24 All computations are performed in R programming language with cmd scale command 
from package stats. 
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scaling (MDS). The dimensional reduction clusters BITs that share common 
features together and those that contain different elements apart. Circles represent 
BITs that contain less than 20 articles, while triangles represent BITs with more 
than 20 articles. 
 
Figure 2 shows that the BIT universe is divided into two clusters. First, the 
overwhelming majority of treaties is concentrated on the lower left corner of the 
space. Treaties in that cluster are almost exclusively shortagreements with less than 
20 articles. Second, departing from the first cluster and extending towards the 
upper right edge of the scale is a second cluster that consists of a majority of longer 
agreements with more than 20 articles.  
 
These two clusters, however, are set apart by more than just treaty length. Figure 3 
integrates four new dimensions into the same image by introducing a shade 
gradient that depicts (clockwise from upper left) the treaty’s year of signature as 
well as its number of exception, arbitration and protection provisions. Light 
shading signifies lower scores (earlier agreements or fewer provisions) while dark 
shading represents higher scores (later agreements or more provisions).  
 
Figure 3: The structure of the BIT universe with different variables as shade 
gradient (brighter shading: low numbers; darker shading: high numbers) 
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Note: This figure introduces a colour gradient to the two-dimensional space of 
Figure 2 which characterizes each treaty along four variables: (1) the treaty’s year of 
signature as well as its number of (2) exception, (3) arbitration and (4) protection 
provisions. Light shading signifies lower scores (earlier agreements or fewer 
provisions) while dark shading represents higher scores (later agreements or more 
provisions).  
 
Several distinctions thus become visible. First, whereas treaties on the left of the 
space are predominantly early agreements; those on the right are mostly recent 
treaties. Second, these early agreements on the left contain several protection 
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clauses, but very few exception or arbitration provisions. Those on the right, in 
contrast, contain considerably more exceptions, provide for more detailed 
arbitration procedures and also entail more protective provisions. The divide 
between the two clusters is thus one of scope, content and complexity as well as 
time. Finally, the two clusters differ in their internal homogeneity. While the denser 
one on the left is also relatively uniform in its protection, exception and arbitration 
dimension, the cluster on the right is more scattered both spatially and in terms of 
its varying content. 
 
In summary, the BIT universe is marked by a two-part structure, which we retrace 
in Figure 4.25 In shorthand, we describe the two types of agreement areas as a 
“shallow” versus a “deep” cluster. On the one hand, there is the large group of 
older, short and relatively similar treaties that are “shallow” in scope since they 
contain fewer protection and exception clauses and provide little detail on the 
procedure of investor-state arbitration. On the other hand, there is the smaller 
group of more complex and comprehensive agreements. These “deeper” treaties 
have emerged more recently, and generally contain more protection, exception and 
arbitration features, but alsodiverge more strongly in content. 
 
Figure 4: The Two Clusters within the BIT Universe 
 
                                                 
25 We identify and colour-code the two clusters by using a means algorithm with the 
centroids at the coordinates (-1,0) and (3.5,2). 
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Note: This figure annotates Figure 2 distinguishing the two BIT clusters of deep 
agreements (crosses) and shallow ones (circles).  
 
In consequence, the structure of the IIA universe points to two theoretical 
consolidation options. Existing treaties can either be consolidated at the bottom 
taking the cluster of shallow agreements as benchmark or they can be consolidated 
at the top aiming for a multilateral treaty that is deeper and more ambitious. 
 
B. Shallow vs. Deep Consolidation 
 
The question then arises how easy it is to consolidate investment law at the top or 
at the bottom? To provide a nuanced answer, we assess the prevalence and 
consensus surrounding the different clauses that States commonly insert into their 
investment treaties. For that we use the second-level of our four-level coding, 
which roughly corresponds to a list of 66 core treaty features. 
 
We begin by plotting the relative prevalence of each treaty feature in its respective 
cluster in Figure 5. The x-axis orders the treaty features in our codebook by their 
prevalence in the entire BIT universe. While both clusters share a number of 
prominent treaty features, such as expropriation or transfer clauses, they otherwise 
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diverge in scope. The shallow cluster is dominated by relatively few, pervasive 
features that primarily deal with investment protection; the deeper cluster, in turn, 
is characterized by a broader range of clauses on investment protection, arbitration 
and exceptions. Moreover, the relative prevalence of individual features differs 
between the shallow and deep clusters. For example, shallow agreements contain 
higher frequencies of umbrella or arbitrary measures clauses, whereas these 
provisions have fallen into disuse in deeper BITs. Other elements that are rare or 
non-existent in shallow BITs have proliferated in deep agreements. Performance 
requirements or capital controls, for instance, have become more common and 
new elements such as transparency in arbitration have been added to deeper BITs.  
 
These differences have repercussions for the consolidation potential of BITs from 
each cluster. The dark line in Figure 5 traces the share of treaties that would be 
completely substituted by a multilateral treatycontaining the most prevalent 
features up to a given rank. For instance, a treaty containing the 19 most prevalent 
treaty features would fully substitute the content of around 5% of existing BITs. 
That share would quickly rise with every new feature.A treaty with the 27 most 
prevalent features would already substitute 50% of BITs andone with the 36 most 
prominent features could replace 80% of agreements. Thereafter, the substitution 
rate slows down considerably with every new feature adding only small increments 
of substituted treaties. Differently put, while at first it is worthwhile to add more 
features to augment the share of substituted treaties, the marginal benefit of every 
new feature starts to decline after the 30th feature. As a result, it would 
becomparatively easier to replace most shallow BITs with a multilateral substitute 
consisting of the 30 or so most prevalent features, but it would get progressively 
more difficult to also consolidate deep agreements that are more varied and 
contain less common provisions. 
 
Figure 5: Relative prevalence of coded features in theshallow (black circles) and 
deep (red crosses) cluster and a black line tracing the potential for multilateral 
consolidation, i.e.the share of BITssubstituted by afuture multilateral agreement 
that contains all the features left of a given point on the x-axis. 
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Note: This figure ranks 66 coded features in accordance with their prevalence in the 
BIT universe (x-axis) and shows (1) the share of treaties (y-axis) that contain that 
feature per cluster – differentiating between the shallow (black circles) and deep 
(red crosses) cluster - and (2) the share of BITs that a multilateral treaty containing 
all features up to a given point on the x-axis would substitute in terms of content.   
 
Figure 6: Share of State consensus per coded features (share of countries with at 
least one BIT with coded feature) 
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Note: This figure ranks 66 coded features in accordance with their prevalence in the 
BIT universe (x-axis) – but this time relates them to the share of States that have 
adopted it in at least one BIT (y-axis).  
 
Looking exclusively at the relative prevalence of features in a treaty network, 
however, comes with the risk of underestimating the degree of convergence in the 
BIT universe. First, if aState has already agreed to a feature once, it is more likely 
to accept it again. Second, most-favoured nation (MFN) clauses are widely 
understood asextending concessions given in one treaty to all other treaties, since 
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MFN operates so as to incorporate the more favourable treatment granted in other 
agreements also into the MFN’s base treaty.26 Investment protection obligation 
included once will thus often bind a State vis-à-vis all its treaty partners.27 The 
degree of consensus is thus considerably larger than what the feature prevalence in 
individual BITs suggests. Figure 6 therefore displays the same features as Figure 5, 
but this time ranks them bythe underlying State consensus operationalized as the 
share of States that include a given feature at least once. By that measure, the 21 
most prevalent features are supported by 95% or more of the 171 countries 
involved in our dataset. After thatevery new feature leads to a significant decline in 
the underlying State consensusso that at the 35th feature the support drops below 
the 50% level before it begins to level off at around the 42ndfeature with consensus 
of less than 20%. 
 
Both figures convey a common insight. On the one hand, there is a significant 
body of features that finds almost universal acceptance across treaties and 
countries.These core elements could form the nucleus of future consolidation 
efforts. On the other hand, there is also a wide range of features concentrated 
primarily in deep agreements on which consensus is lacking based on our data.28 
Whereas protective features dominate the former camp, exception features 
populate the latter.Table 1 illustrates this divisionhighlighting the different levels of 
State consensus. There iswide support for core investment protection clauses with 
features reaching State acceptance rates of 95% or more. Among these features is 
investor-state arbitration that has been accepted by all Statesin our dataset apart 
from Liberia, Lesotho and Somalia. Hence, there is ample consensus in past 
practice for consolidating treaties around a core of investment protection clauses 
present in both, shallow and deep agreements. At the same time, the propensity to 
accept public policy exception, denial of benefit clauses or non-conforming 
measures is only present in less than 40% of States. Furthermore, these features are 
disproportionately found in deep agreements and almost entirely absent in shallow 
ones. Measured by past practice, consolidation around these exception features 
thus currently lacks wider consensus.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
26Stephan W. Schill, Mulitilateralizing Investment Treaties through Most-Favored-Nation Clauses, 27 
BERKELEY J. INT'L. L. 496(2009), 
http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1373&context=bjil. 
27Id. 
28These results are preliminary only given that we do not consider Free Trade Agreements 
with investment chapters where much innovation takes place and currently only capture a 
part of the BIT universe. 
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Table 1: State consensus around selected protection and exception features 
 
Top Protection 
Features 
State 
Consensus 
Top Exception Features State 
Consensus 
Expropriation 100% (171) 
Economic integration 
exception 98% (169) 
Fair and equitable 
treatment 99% (170) General exception clause 81% (139) 
ISDS 98% (168) Essential security 57% (99) 
Full protection and 
security 97% (167) Capital controls 55% (95) 
National treatment 97% (167) Not weakening standards 49% (84) 
Umbrella clause 95% (164) 
Macroeconomic stability 
exception 39% (68) 
MFN treatment 95% (163) Public policy exception 39% (67) 
Arbitrary measures 94% (161) Denial of benefits 38% (66) 
Personnel’s entry & 
sojourn  80% (138) Non-conforming measures 19% (33) 
Performance 
requirements 59% (102) Exclusion from ISDS 15% (26) 
 
Note: This table tracks state consensus in % and absolute numbers (171 States are 
in our dataset). Following Figure 6, the definition of State consensus for this table 
is that a State has accepted a given feature in at least one BIT.     
 
These numbers show that if investment treaties were only about the protection of 
investors, there would be ample room for consolidating practice around a lowest 
common denominator of core protective features. In that case, states could 
concentrate on updating and fine-tuning the language of their protective provisions 
in light of recent practice in deeper BITs achieving a more precisely worded 
multilateral substitute that replaces older and shallow BITs that are thereby made 
redundant. In contrast, consolidating practice around more complex and 
comprehensive agreements that address a broader range of non-investment 
protection concernsseems more elusive based on past practice. Only a minority of 
States currently include these features and even within the cluster of deep 
agreements there is considerable variation. Consolidation of existing practice thus 
seems easier at the bottom around a lowest common denominator of core 
protection clauses, but is more ambitious at the top when encompassing non-
investment protection concerns. 
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C. Deep Consolidation is Ambitious, yet Desirable 
 
Focusing consolidation efforts exclusively on a common denominator of 
coreinvestment protectionprovisions may be theoretically possible, but arguably 
neither practical or desirable. 
 
On the one hand, consolidation irrespective of its scope has positive effects. It 
reduces inconsistencies across agreements and helps to foster a predictable and 
stable jurisprudence around a limited set of common core provisions. Aside from 
remedying unwanted consequences of fragmentation, it can also help alleviate 
power asymmetries, as currently, developing countries, more than developed 
countries, suffer from a patchwork of inconsistent treaties.29 Perhaps most 
importantly in the BIT context, consolidating practice can also be used to update 
outdated treaty language. While most agreements have fair and equitable treatment 
provisions, for instance, these clauses differ in their degree of precision.30A 
limitedmultilateral deal that builds on consensus around protective clauses in past 
practices, but codifies their more precise variations in recent deep BITs or free 
trade agreements could achieve that. 
 
On the other hand, any consolidation effort focusing exclusively on shallow BITs 
and investment protection would arguably fail to address sustainability concerns 
currently voiced in investment law policy debates. In July 2016, G20 countries 
agreed on Guiding Principles for Global Investment Policymaking, placing investment 
treaties within the pursuit of sustainable developmentobjectives andaffirmingStates’ 
right to regulate the importance of transparency and the responsibility of 
investors.31 Shallow BITs fall short of these objectives. They largely lack public 
policy exceptions or transparency-oriented procedural refinements of investor-state 
arbitration delegating the task to fill gaps left open by the treaty drafters to ad hoc 
arbitrators resulting in an often unpredictable and inconsistent jurisprudence.32For 
thesereasons, international organizations and scholars have forcefully argued that 
recent deeper agreements are more sustainable than shallow older onesas they 
strikea more careful balance between investment protection and non-investment 
concerns.33 In that vein, consolidating practice at the bottom would go against 
                                                 
29Alschner & Skougarevskiy, supra note 3 at 19. 
30 See e.g. Caroline Henckels, Protecting Regulatory Autonomy through Greater Precision in 
Investment Treaties: The TPP, CETA, and TTIP, 19 J. INT. ECON. LAW 27–50 (2016). 
31 G20 GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR GLOBAL INVESTMENT POLICYMAKING, available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/G20-Guiding-Principles-for-Global-
Investment-Policymaking.pdf. 
32 UNCTAD, Interpretation of IIAs: What States Can Do, UNCTAD IIA ISSUE NOTE (2011), 
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/webdiaeia2011d10_en.pdf. 
33A. Van Aaken, International Investment Law between Commitment and Flexibility: A Contract 
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current trends in policy-making by codifying a model of investment protection 
agreements that is not sustainable.  
 
That means the consolidation at the bottom, though seemingly easier, is ultimately 
undesirable. We are thus left with a consolidation at the top. Consolidating best 
practices rather than lowest common denominators offers countries the 
opportunity to make their existing treaty networks more sustainable. Yet while 
desirable, an ambitious, deepagreement is also more difficult to achieve since it 
cannot be builtaround existing consensus. How difficult deep consolidation will be 
then, again, depends on the scope of policy convergence found among those States 
engaged in it. We will thus devote the remainder of the paper to investigate the 
potential for consolidation at the top by identifying areas of convergence and 
divergence in the practice surrounding deep investment agreements. 
 
V. DIVERGENCE AS OBSTACLE FOR CONSOLIDATION 
 
Our data exposes three main sources of divergence in existing state practicein 
relation to deep agreements that pose obstacles for future consolidation and 
multilateralization to varying degrees. First, most obviously, there is a gap between 
States that sign deep agreements and those that sign shallow agreements. Second, 
even where States sign deep agreements, they diverge in the issues they prioritize, 
resulting in deep agreements that vary more strongly in treaty design than their 
simpler counterparts. Third, even where States share common policy priorities, 
their strategies to address the same policy challenges often diverge. While the rift 
created by diverging treaty scope and depth seems to be closing, divergence on 
policy preferencespersists, and the gap on finding common design solutions to 
common policy problems is ever-widening.  
 
A. Divergence I: Shallow vs. Deep Agreements 
 
Over the past two decades, investment treaty-making has changed.Deeper 
agreements are increasingly trendsetters, rather than outliers, as more and more 
countries depart from signing short and simple agreements and turn towards 
                                                                                                                       
Theory Analysis, 12 J. INT'L. ECON. L. 507–38 (2009); S. A. Spears, The Quest for Policy Space in 
a New Generation of International Investment Agreements, 13 J. INT'L. ECON. L. 1037–75 (2010); 
MARIE-CLAIRE CORDONIER SEGGER ET. AL EDS., SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN 
WORLD INVESTMENT  LAW (2011); UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT - TOWARDS 
A NEW GENERATION OF INVESTMENT POLICIES (2012), 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2012_embargoed_en.pdf; J. ANTHONY VAN 
DUZER, PENELOPE SIMONS & GRAHAM MAYEDA, INTEGRATING SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT INTO INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: A GUIDE FOR 
DEVELOPING COUNTRY NEGOTIATORS (2013). 
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increasingly comprehensive and complex agreements.The United States, Canada, 
Japan and Mexico have long been at the forefront of countries concluding deeper 
agreements with 20 articles or more, whereas States in Asia or Europe lagged 
behind, signing short and simple treaties. Yet, when we look at the current policy 
of these latter States, the picture changes. India, for instance the country that has 
signed most shallow agreements since 2000 has halted its investment treaty 
program after being subjected to investment claims and has published a revised, 
deeper model BIT in early 2016 containing 24 articles.34 Similarly, European States 
used to sign predominately short and simple agreements.35 Yet, with the shift of 
competency over investment policy to the EU, the EU Commission has 
championed a more complex and comprehensive investment treaty design.36 The 
investment chapter of the FTA between the EU and Canada (CETA), for instance, 
contains 45 provisions. In short, as more and more countries shift towards more 
complex and comprehensive agreements, the divide between proponents of 
shallow and deep agreements becomes less important. Figure 4’s bifurcation of the 
IIA universe intothose States favouring shallower agreements and those 
Statespreferring deeper agreements is thus likely to be only temporary. The global 
turn towards more complex agreements, in turn, paves the way towards future 
multilateralization at the top.37 
 
B. Divergence II: Differing Policy Preferences 
 
Even though consensus is beginning to form around more complex and 
comprehensive treaty design, countries’ preferences increasingly diverge on what 
specific content such deeper agreements should contain.  
 
                                                 
34MODEL TEXT FOR THE INDIAN BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY, available at 
https://www.mygov.in/sites/default/files/master_image/Model%20Text%20for%20the%
20Indian%20Bilateral%20Investment%20Treaty.pdf [hereinafter Indian Model BIT].  
35Nikos Lavranos, The New EU Investment Treaties: Convergence towards the NAFTA Model as the 
New Plurilateral Model BIT Text?, SSRN (2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2241455. 
36 See Article 188 C (1) of the Treaty of Lisbon (Article 207 (1) Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union (TFEU). See Julien Chaisse, Promises and Pitfalls of the European Union 
Policy on Foreign Investment—How will the New EU Competence on FDI affect the Emerging Global 
Regime?, 15 J. INT'L. ECON. L. 51–84 (2012); August Reinisch, Putting the Pieces Together … an 
EU Model BIT?, 15 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 679–704 (2014). 
37 Given that the drive towards greater complexity and depth has been spearheaded by the 
United States, one of us has termed this development an “Americanization” of the BIT 
universe. See Wolfgang Alschner, Americanization of the BIT Universe: The Influence of Friendship, 
Commerce and Navigation (FCN) Treaties on Modern Investment Treaty Law, 5 GOETTINGEN J. 
INT'L. L. 455–86 (2013) [hereinafter Alschner]; Filippo Fontanelli & Giuseppe Bianco, 
Converging Towards NAFTA: An Analysis of FTA Investment Chapters in the European Union and 
the United States, 50 STAN. J. INT'L. L. 211–359 (2014) [hereinafter Fontanelli & Bianco]. 
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Figure 7 compares the average distribution of the content of the last five BITs 
concluded by Japan, Canada, Mexico, Belgium, Turkey, and Germany. Each of 
these countries has a distinct approach when it comes to treaty content. Canada 
dedicates significant treaty space to investor-state arbitration (ISDS), but also has 
sections on general exceptions and non-investment obligations. Mexico, on the 
other hand, equally extensively deals with investor-state arbitration procedures but 
devotes little attention to non-investment interests. The opposite is true for 
Belgium that has few clauses on ISDS, but accords considerable space to non-
protection obligations, or Turkey that includes elaborate general exceptions. 
Finally, Japan divides its treaties relatively evenly among all subject matters while 
Germany does not devote any attention to non-investment concerns. We thus see 
considerable divergence among countries’ approaches to the expanding issues 
covered in BITs. 
 
Figure 7. BIT article content of selected countries 
 
 
 
Note: This figure measures the average share of articles per subject matter for the 
last five BITs each of the selected countries has signed. 
 
Differing preferences over what issues investment treaties are to cover are 
therefore an important source of divergence among States. As countries move 
towards deeper and more complex agreements, further consensus needs to be built 
to allow preferences to converge and to prepare the ground for multilateral 
consolidation. 
 
C. Divergence III: Design Fragmentation 
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Yet even where States agree on the policy objectives that investment treaties 
should pursue, theyoften disagree on how to get there. Recent negotiations and 
draft agreements illustrate this development. While, for instance, the United States, 
the EU, and India, all agree that investor-state arbitration has to be embedded in 
an institutional set-up capable of reining in arbitral misinterpretation and conflicts 
of interest, they disagree on how this is to be done. The United States favours an 
ad hoc investor-state arbitration architecture that dates back to NAFTA, which has 
been further refined in the recent TPP in light of lessons learned from litigation.38 
The EU, in contrast, wants to replace investment arbitration with a permanent 
investment court system.39 India, in turn, in its recently published model BIT, 
accepts investor-state arbitration but limits access to it by requiring an exhaustion 
of local remedies.40 Even though all these three States pursue the same goal – 
fixing a dispute settlement architecture that suffers from conflicts of interest and 
inconsistent outcomes – they follow very different strategies. 
 
This example illustrates another important source of divergence –treaty design 
fragmentation– where States increasingly choose different options from a menu of 
design alternatives to remedy similar policy concerns. While this is a perfectly 
rational strategy for individual States, it also makes future consolidation more 
difficult by further fragmenting treaty design. In the past, treaty design variations 
were limited as States largely opted into a set of core protection elements that were 
in turn derived from a small number of draft conventions.41 This is beginning to 
change as countries like Brazil42 invent new approaches to treaty design or combine 
existing treaty formulations of other states. Often, countries do not take these 
formulations as a package deal, but rather pick individual elements that are then 
joined in novel combinations thereby increasing fragmentation. We illustrate this 
trend by reference to selective copying from North American treaty practice and 
                                                 
38 For commentary on the approach, see Lisa Sachs & Lise Johnson, The TPP’s Investment 
Chapter: Entrenching, Rather Than Reforming, a Flawed System, CCSI POLICY PAPER, November 
2015, available at: http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2015/11/TPP-entrenching-flaws-21-
Nov-FINAL.pdf. 
39 European Commission, EU Finalises Proposal for Investment Protection and Court System for 
TTIP, Press Release (12 November 2015), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-15-6059_en.htm.  
40 Article 14(3) of the Indian Model BIT, available at 
https://www.mygov.in/sites/default/files/master_image/Model%20Text%20for%20the%
20Indian%20Bilateral%20Investment%20Treaty.pdf.  
41STEPHAN W. SCHILL, THE MULTILATERALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
LAW 89–98 (2009). 
42 The Brazil–Mozambique and Brazil–Angola Cooperation and Investment Facilitation Agreements 
(CIFAs): A Descriptive Overview, INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS, May 21, 2015, available at 
https://www.iisd.org/itn/2015/05/21/the-brazil-mozambique-and-brazil-angola-
cooperation-and-investment-facilitation-agreements-cifas-a-descriptive-overview/. 
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by introducing the 2016 Iran–Slovakia BIT as a mosaic of existing practices. 
 
The investment treaty practiceof the United States has been a source of inspiration 
for many States when formulating their investment policy. Joining the BIT 
universe only in 1982, it became one of the first countries to face investment 
claims in the late 1990s.43 Its 2004 model BIT that resulted from its experience as 
respondent in investment arbitration has since served as reference point for other 
countries seeking to adjust their treaty models.44 Yet, as we illustrate, this 
inspiration typically takes the form of selective copying rather than a full 
endorsement of the American design, in relation to national treatment as well as 
fair and equitable treatment provisions. 
 
When entering the BIT universe, the United States introduced two changes to 
national treatment clauses as compared to existing BIT practices by European 
States. First, drawing on its prior Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCN) 
treaties, the country extended national treatment to the acquisition and 
establishment phase.45 Thereby, it added a liberalization component to BITs that 
were hitherto exclusively concerned with behind-the-border protection.46 In 
addition, it also made clear that an assessment of discrimination between foreigners 
and nationals needed to compare investors and investments that are “in like 
situations” or “in like circumstances”. This addition became important in 
subsequent litigation as tribunals struggled to define suitable comparator groups 
for claiming investors in national treatment disputes.47 
 
Our data shows how both sub-elements of national treatment have subsequently 
spread throughout the BIT universe. Although their relative frequency is still quite 
modest, with about 4% of all BITs containing liberalization elements and 10% 
                                                 
43See generally KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, U.S. INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
AGREEMENTS (2009). 
44On the 2004 innovations, see Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A Comparison of the 2004 and 
1994 US Model BITs: Rebalancing Investor and Host Country Interests,  in YEARBOOK ON 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND POLICY 2008-9 (Karl P. Sauvant ed., 2009); On 
States being inspired by the 2004 model,see M. Kinnear & R. Hansen, The Influence of 
NAFTA Chapter 11 in the BIT Landscape, 12 UC DAVIS J. INT'L. POL. 101 (2005); Efraim 
Chalamish, An Oasis in the Desert: The Emergency of Israeli Investment Treaties in the Global 
Economy, 32 LOY. L.A.. INT'L. & COMP. L. REV. 123 (2010); Fontanelli and Bianco, supra 
note 37. 
45Alschner, supra note 37. 
46UNCTAD, ADMISSION AND ESTABLISHMENT, UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/10 (vol. II), U.N. 
Sales No. E.99.II.D.10. (1999),http://unctad.org/en/Docs/iteiit10v2_en.pdf; PATRICK 
JUILLARD, L’ÉVOLUTION DES SOURCES DU DROIT DES INVESTISSEMENTS (1994). 
47Nicholas DiMascio & Joost Pauwelyn, Non-Discrimination in Trade and Investment Treaties: 
Worlds Apart or Two Sides of the Same Coin?, 102 AM. J. INT'L. L. 48–89 (2008). 
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providing comparator terms, these shares are much greater when we consider the 
countries party to such BITs. In fact, 36% of all signatories to BITs have 
concluded at least one BIT with a pre-establishment national treatment clause and 
63% have signed on to a clause with comparator terms.  
 
A similar process can be observed in relation to clarifications to the fair and 
equitable treatment standard. In July 2001, the Free Trade Commission (FTC) of 
NAFTA, consisting of representatives of Mexico, Canada and the United States, 
issued an authoritative interpretation pursuant to Article 1131(2) of NAFTA’s fair 
and equitable treatment clause in Article 1105. Reining in expansive interpretations 
by prior arbitral awards, the Commission stated that the obligation to provide 
investors with “fair and equitable treatment” (FET) does not require a treatment 
above or beyond the customary international law minimum standard of 
treatment.48 After the decision, the link between FET and customary international 
law was explicitly taken up in the subsequent treaty practice of the United States, 
Canada and Mexico from where it diffused to other countries.49Today at least 42 
countries are parties to BITs that explicitly root FET in the customary international 
law minimum standard of treatment (Figure 8). 
 
Aside from linking FET to custom, the Commission also stated that “[a] 
determination that there has been a breach of another provision of the NAFTA, or 
of a separate international agreement, does not establish that there has been a 
breach of [FET].”50AsFigure 8 highlights, Canada, Mexico and the United States 
included the FTC interpretation as a package deal into theirBITs. Other countries, 
at the periphery of the figure, however only incorporated the link to custom, but 
not the indirect breach exclusion. This illustrates the effect of selection. Where 
diffusion takes place through imitation, rather than through treaty-making with the 
innovative core, countries are selective in terms of theinnovation they adopt. Such 
selection then becomes a source of design divergence and fragmentation. 
 
Figure 8: Country network of BITs involving FET clauses linked to customary law 
with (blue) and without (red) indirect breach carve-out 
 
                                                 
48 NAFTA Free Trade Commission, NOTES OF INTERPRETATION OF CERTAIN CHAPTER 
11 PROVISIONS, sec. B (2), July 31, 2001, available at 
http://www.sice.oas.org/tpd/nafta/Commission/CH11understanding_e.asp.  
49 UNCTAD, FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT, (UNCTAD ed., 2012), 
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d5_en.pdf. 
50  NAFTA Free Trade Commission, NOTES OF INTERPRETATION OF CERTAIN CHAPTER 
11 PROVISIONS, sec. B (3), July 31, 2001, available 
athttp://www.sice.oas.org/tpd/nafta/Commission/CH11understanding_e.asp. 
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Note: This figure represents BITs as ties between signatory countries as nodes. Ties 
are colour-coded to show when diffusion occurred as package deal (blue) versus 
selective cherry-picking (red).   
 
Selective adoption and re-combinations of existing features are likely to become a 
growing source of treaty design divergence. The recently concluded 2016 BIT 
between Iran and Slovakia epitomizes this trend. Rather than being rooted in any 
specific BIT tradition, the agreement is a mosaic of clauses taken and adapted from 
different sources.51 Article 3 on the standard of treatment, which includes fair and 
                                                 
51 For an in-depth discussion, see Wolfgang Alschner & Dmitriy Skougarevskiy, BITs 
reloaded – How European States are Rebooting their Investment Treaty Programs, Mapping BITs 
Blog, July 29, 2016, available at 
http://mappinginvestmenttreaties.com/blog/2016/07/european-bit-programme-reload/. 
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equitable treatment and full protection and security, is textually most closely related 
to Article X.10 of CETA (2015), while excluding some of the latter’s features such 
as the admissibility of the investor’s legitimate expectations. Article 11 on general 
exceptions partially mirrors Article 10 of the Canada–Jordan BIT (2010). Article 20 
on claims manifestly without merit relies on the language from the Australia–Chile 
FTA (2009) Investment Chapter Article 10.20. Particularly surprising is that the 
Iran-Slovakia BIT’s closest overall neighbour is the 2004 U.S. model BIT with 51% 
of textual overlap, rather than CETA or another European country’s BIT. This 
highlightsthe emerging trend that BIT design is growing more diverse as countries 
select, mix and match innovations from different parts of the globe. This starkly 
increases design variation and fragmentation in a field historically marked by path 
dependent treaty design rooted in influential model or draft agreements rather than 
organic innovation. 
 
VI. MANAGING CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE:  THE PATH 
TOWARDS MULTILATERALIZATION 
 
The above empirical assessment of the scope for multilateral consolidation based 
on the convergence and divergence of existing BIT practice yielded two major 
insights. First, while shallow consolidation around a dozen investment protection 
provisions is supported by ample practice, it is not desirable given the current 
policy discourse that favours deeper and more sustainable treaties that strike a 
balance between investment protection and non-investment concerns. Second, 
consolidation around such deeper, more ambitious agreements, whilst desirable, is 
currently not backed by up by common and widespread State practice. Indeed, 
deeper agreements tend to diverge more strongly as variation across BITs is 
increasing through selective adaptation and recombination. 
 
What does that mean for the consolidation of BITs? On the one hand, current 
trends indicate that States have little appetite for consolidation. Countries from 
India and Brazil to Slovakia or the European Union are instead experimenting with 
new treaty design challenging IIAs’ hitherto prevalent path dependency.52 
Innovation rather than consolidation seems to be the primary objective of States’ 
investment policyat least in the short term. On the other hand, this quest for 
change also constitutes an opportunity for consolidation in the medium term 
asStates are increasingly swayed by the current policy discourse to sign deeper 
agreements. Seizing the occasion, efforts should be concentrated towards ensuring 
that the drive towards deeper agreements reduces rather than exacerbates treaty 
design divergence and fragmentation. 
                                                 
52See also Wolfgang Alschner, Locked-in Language: Historical Sociology and the Textual Path 
Dependency of International Investment Treaties, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE SOCIOLOGY 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Moshe Hirsch & Andrew Lang eds., Forthcoming 2017). 
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Managing the tension between the innovation and consolidation thus emerges as 
one of the primary challenges for investment policy-makers in our time. Even as 
experimentation with respect to specific treaty design choices continues, states will 
need to agree on what policy areas should form part of an investment agreement. 
Similarly, as countries increasingly diverge on the remedies they choose to address 
the same policy problems, they should keep track of what works and what does not 
in order to incrementally build consensus around the best performing design 
choices. Innovation, selective diffusion and recombination will thus lead to a 
proliferation of varying deep treaty design architectures in the short run, but may 
facilitate convergence around a gold standard in the medium term.  
 
The primary order of the day for those aiming for gradual multilateral convergence 
will thus have to be to better manage further BIT differentiation. Rather than 
leaving it to each country to design individual remedies to policy problems faced by 
every State, the system would benefit from a greater emphasis on joint efforts on 
two levels.  
 
First, consolidation can come through regionalization. As regional blocks develop 
common approaches to investment policy making, regional investment agreements 
can serve as stepping-stones for eventual multilateralization. Yet, currently regional 
agreements are not used effectively enough for this purpose. Outdated and 
diverging BITs are not phased out and continue to exist in parallel to regional 
agreements.53Moreover, new BITs are signed that deviate from regional 
benchmarks. Although the EU Commission has to authorize and approve new 
BITs concluded by its member States,54 the Slovakia–Iran BIT illustrates that such 
agreements can differ markedly from regional benchmarks. Hence, more emphasis 
should be placed on streamlining investment treaty content regionally to permit 
innovation while promoting convergence. 
 
Second, multilateralization of selected issues can help clear the path for a broader 
global umbrella treaty. Efforts by the EU to multilateralize its proposed investment 
court system go into that direction. Similarly, the Mauritius Convention, which 
updates the BITs of its signatories with respect to transparency in investment 
arbitration, is another means by which a fragmented treaty practice can be 
converged.55 Finally, international fora such as the G20 can foster multilateral 
                                                 
53Alschner, Regionalism, supra note 7. 
54Commission Regulation 1219/2012, Establishing Transitional Arrangements for Bilateral 
Investment Agreements Between Member States and Third Countries, 2012 O. J. (L 
351/40). 
55 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON TRANSPARENCY IN TREATY-BASED INVESTOR-
STATE ARBITRATION (2015), available at 
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consensus building, including through follow-up work on their 2016 Guiding 
Principles for Global Investment Policymaking.56 
 
The common thread of these strategies should be the insight that converging 
practice facilitates consolidation, which, in turn, is a precondition for 
multilateralism.  
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
This article has empirically investigated convergence and divergence in the BIT 
universe in order to scope the potential for multilateral consolidation. While it 
found consensus in treaty practice for consolidation around short and shallow 
agreements, current policy discourse favours the more ambitious consolidation 
around deep, complex and more sustainable treaties. To achieve the latter goal, 
further consensus-building is needed. Specifically, those advocating for 
multilateralism should strive to manage further differentiation and fragmentation 
among BITs, reducing the sources of divergence identified in this article while 
permitting design innovation. Regional consolidation and partial multilateralization 
are important strategies to this effect. 
  
                                                                                                                       
https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/transparency-
convention/Transparency-Convention-e.pdf. 
56Supra note 31. 
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ANNEX 
 
We developed anautomated coding pipeline that proceeds in several steps in order 
to identify whether a given feature from the codebook is present in a given BIT 
article. 
 
First, we begin by extracting all article headers from our data, resulting in over 
1200 unique article titles. We then manually match each article header to a first and 
second level branch of our tree structure. We allow for multiple assignments of the 
same article header to different branches. By placing each article into a branch (or 
branches) of the tree, we add efficiency and precision to our subsequent key word 
search, because we can thereby limit the scope of the search to sub-branches of the 
tree. For example, an article named “Definition” will prospectively be searched for 
elements from the “definition” branch, e.g. the notion of “investor” or 
“investment”, but not for features contained in the “standards of protection” 
branch or other branches. Differently put, article headers limit the search to 
elements typically found in articles with that article header.  
 
The main problem we encounter, however, is that not all articles have article 
headers. We thus use a supervised machine-learning algorithm to predict article 
titles for those articles that do not have article headers.57 Now, each article can be 
assigned to at least one branch and sub-branch of the tree based on its real or 
inferred article header. 
 
Second, we assign more detailed sub-branches of the tree to each article based on 
key words contained in its article texts. For each fourth-level sub-branch of the 
tree, we identify associated key words and terms, e.g. the words “fair and 
equitable” will be assigned to the part of the tree dealing with “fair and equitable 
treatment”, “expropriate” will denote “expropriation” and “health” will connect to 
“public policy exception”. We then search for these key words in the article full 
texts. Crucially, as discussed above, we limit the scope of search to those articles, 
which have been assigned branches of the tree based on their article headers, 
                                                 
57 We rely on Matt Taddy, Multinomial Inverse Regression for Text Analysis, 108 J.AM. STAT. A. 
755–70 (2013) to conduct this task. We learn the inverse relationship between article header 
and its text word counts by regressing the latter on the former in the first stage (gamma-
LASSO multinomial regression with regularization) for the BIT articles with headers. We 
then compute the sufficient reduction of those article texts, and in the second stage learn 
the relationship between them and article headers with a multinomial forward regression of 
the incidence of article header on sufficient reduction of its text. In the third stage we 
construct the sufficient reduction of the texts of header-less articles and predict their 
headers with the aid of the relationship estimated by the forward model trained on articles 
with headers in the previous step. 
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where we would expect a conceptual category represented by a key word to occur. 
For instance, “health” may appear in the preamble of a treaty or in a public policy 
exception. By excluding preambles from the scope of the search where we are 
looking for health public policy exceptions, we prevent false positives. Figure 9 
summarizes the procedure. 
 
Figure 9: Description of automated pipeline to extract features from article-level 
treaty data 
 
 
 
Finally, we combine the output of the key word and the article header-based 
assignment into a data set that lists the presence or absence of each element of our 
tree for each of our articles. As a result, we can easily identify in which articles a 
specific treaty feature is present and aggregate this information for each treaty or 
year. We can also embark on more general queries by aggregating this information, 
e.g. by counting the number of exceptions or protection provisions in an 
agreement or checking whether an agreement provides consent to investor-state 
arbitration. Our automated coding thus allows for a versatile analysis of treaty 
content in unprecedented depth and breadth. 
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